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The year 2019 will be an election year in Ukraine, with a presidential election in the spring and 
a parliamentary election in the autumn. The short timeframe and the order in which these 
two elections will be held increase the chances of the winner of the presidential election 
forming the largest faction in parliament. The first phase of election campaigning has already 
begun, with Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko as the main contenders, but opinion 
polls are inconclusive. The atmosphere surrounding the campaign is one of mistrust on the 
part of voters in the authorities and the political class. Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution cre-
ated expectations politicians could not fulfil.
The incumbent president is trying to consolidate those closest to him and eliminate any rivals 
so as to become the only choice for governmental rule before active campaigning begins. 
Poroshenko is also bringing financial, media, and administrative resources to bear to reduce 
his rivals’ potential and increase his impact on voters. In addition to stressing foreign policy 
successes and achievements in reforming the country, campaigning will also feature anti- 
-Russian rhetoric and an emphasis on the sense of subjectivity that Ukraine and its people, 
(re)gained as a result of the Revolution. More assertive rhetoric towards international finan-
cial institutions, the EU, and certain Member States can also be expected.
Though the electoral mechanism is set to go into full swing in September, whether the cam-
paign will ultimately be successful remains in doubt. Support for Poroshenko is declining 
and is at its lowest since 2014. Cracks within the ruling camp are increasingly evident, with 
no apparent vision as to how to compete effectively with Yulia Tymoshenko, tipped by polls 
as the favourite. Tymoshenko has profited from both errors and inaction, and from reform 
carried out by the post-Maidan authorities which has had painful consequences for society. 
The president’s chances of re-election will be slight without some new and irrefutable success 
to show the electorate. Partners and other key political players cannot fail to notice the signs 
of Poroshenko’s vulnerability. Their current support for Poroshenko is not absolute, and they 
could shift their support to a more promising candidate. This means that in Ukraine the old 
alliances are going out of fashion, and at the same time no new alliances have yet been estab-
lished. An intense battle has begun behind the scenes between the oligarchs and politicians, 
from which the main contenders for power in 2019 will emerge. 
Seeking a Ukrainian Macron 
Four years after the Revolution of Dignity, 
Ukrainian society has grown weary of war and 
dismayed at the slow pace of change and poor 
standard of living. Seventy-four per cent of the 
population think that Ukraine is heading in the 
wrong direction. Ukrainians list the main barri-
ers to the country’s development as the Donbas 
conflict, the fact that economic reconstruction 
Poroshenko stands alone.
Ukraine politics in a pre-election year
2OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 269
is taking too long, and the lack of visible pro-
gress in the fight against corruption1. A Rating 
Group poll in April 2018 showed that Petro Po-
roshenko has just 9% support, and his party 
only 7.5%. Arseniy Yatsenyuk and the People’s 
Front are below the level of statistical error, 
whereas trust in politicians and state institu-
tions is at its lowest since the revolution (see 
annex). The populist groups, Oleh Lashko’s Rad-
ical Party, Servant of the People (Sluha narodu), 
For Life (Za zhyttia), and Fatherland (Batkivsh-
chyna), are gaining in popularity, with com-
bined support of almost 40%. These parties are 
proposing simple but unrealistic solutions for 
the country’s development. 
Another result of the disappointment at the 
lack of anticipated changes following the Rev-
olution of Dignity is the public’s need for new 
faces in politics – people who have not been 
publicly discredited. In the presidential elec-
tion poll mentioned above, 17% of voters said 
they were considering voting for either singer 
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk or satirical actor Vladimir 
Zelenskiy2, and in Kyiv the names of Naftohaz 
president, Andriy Kobolyev, and the director of 
the National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 
1 Findings of sociological research Кому довірити 
боротися з корупцією і формувати Антикорупційний 
суд – думка населення of December 2017 con-
ducted by Centrum Razumkowa and Fundacja 
Demokratyczne Inicjatywy, http://dif.org.ua/article/
komu-doviriti-borotisya-z-koruptsieyu-i-formuvati-an-
tikoruptsiyniy-sud-dumka-naselennya 
2 Vakarchuk is frontman of the group Okean Elzy, and is 
pro-western and pro-reform, but in the past has been 
unwilling to run for election. Zelenskiy presents a pop-
ular satiric programme on the television station 1+1, 
owned by oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. This suggests that 
if he or his party Servant of the People (in practice this 
party does not exist) decided to take part in the election 
this would be at the inspiration of the oligarch. 
Artem Sytnyk, have also been circulating. At the 
same time, more than 20% of voters are unable 
or unwilling to say which candidate they intend 
to vote for, and more than 10% would vote for 
somebody not mentioned in the polls. Almost 
half would look for an alternative among the 
new parties. 
The crisis in the ruling camp and the fall in the 
approval rating of the incumbent president is 
due to a number of factors, primarily the fail-
ure to deliver on his promises of quick and 
far-reaching changes in the country: ending the 
war in the Donbas, de-oligarchisation, fight-
ing corruption, or selling Roshen, for instance. 
The disappointment is exacerbated further 
by the public’s high expectations of the new, 
post-revolution authorities. Poroshenko has not 
managed to avoid corruption scandals involv-
ing his closest business partners. His approval 
rating has also decreased following revelations 
about his luxurious lifestyle3. When voting for 
a party or a politician, Ukrainians consider first 
and foremost what they offer with regard to 
social and economic support4. In this area, the 
president has not enjoyed any clear successes. 
Moreover, as head of state and negotiator of 
loan agreements with the International Mone-
tary Fund and EU, he is commonly associated, 
along with Yatsenyuk, with rising utility bills 
and the low rate of the hryvnia, exacerbating 
the decline in the standard of living.
Re-election strategy 
Poroshenko has begun moves aimed at re-elec-
tion, although no official statement has been 
made, by attempting to close ranks and neu-
tralise potential rivals. He has taken meas-
ures to consolidate the ruling camp and agree 
a formula for the two coalition parties, the Po-
roshenko Bloc and People’s Front, to join forces. 
3 One week’s holiday in the Maldives at a supposed cost 
of USD 500 000.
4 Poll by Ratting Group Суспільно-політичні настрої 
населення: нові виклики, April 2018, http://ratinggroup.
ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ukraine_042018_
press_ua.pdf 
More than 20% of voters are unable to say 
whom they intend to vote for, more than 
10% would vote for someone not men-
tioned in the poll, and almost 50% would 
seek an alternative among the new parties.
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This attempt proved unsuccessful, however 
The People’s Front and Prime Minister Volod-
ymyr Hroisman, who work together, are said 
not to have agreed to share places on a joint 
list5 as this was not in their interest. The failure 
of the talks is a symptom of a deepening crisis 
of faith in the ruling coalition. The tension can 
be seen in particular in relations between the 
prime minister and the president: Poroshenko, 
who introduced Hroisman to high-level politics 
following the Euromaidan Revolution (he was 
mayor of Vinnytsia at the time), now regards 
him increasingly as a potential rival. In turn, 
Hroisman has been distancing himself from 
his formal benefactor and promotes an im-
age of himself as the greatest reformer in the 
ruling camp, building his own political camp 
at the same time and working more closely 
with the People’s Front. The relations between 
the presidential camp and that party, which is 
a consortium of separate groups centred around 
individual politicians, often take the form of 
rivalry rather than cooperation. One example 
is Arsen Avakov, Interior Minister since 2014, 
who is emerging as the second most important 
person in the country due to his influence over 
the National Police and the National Guard and 
a strong financial position. Avakov is a public 
figure who openly demonstrates that an alli-
ance with the president is not the only solution. 
Although the key players in the ruling camp 
are aware that a possible early parliamentary 
election, held in 20186, would probably mean 
losing power, this will not stop them making 
“separatist” attempts to gain the best possible 
starting position before next year’s election.
Poroshenko needs a consensus in the ruling 
camp in order to be able to make effective use 
of the so-called adminresurs, being bureau-
5 Команди Порошенка й Яценюка домовляються про 
об’єднання, “Українська правда”, 13.09.2017, https://
www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/09/13/7155038/ 
6 Early elections are possible in early autumn 2018 at the 
latest because under the Constitution they can be held 
no less than 6 months prior to a presidential election, 
which is planned for 31 March 2019. 
cratic, administrative and financial resources 
at the disposal of the executive powers: state 
regional and district administration authorities. 
The open procedure to appoint heads of those 
authorities was abolished in order to achieve 
this 7. The president also aims to gain the sup-
port of the mayors of the major cities, which 
is evident from the personnel-related conces-
sions made to the UDAR party of Kyiv’s mayor, 
Vitali Klitschko (part of the president’s party). 
It can also be seen by the prolonged court trial 
of Kharkiv mayor, Hennadiy Kernes, and pro-
ceedings concerning Odessa mayor, Hennadiy 
Trukhanov. The president’s other allies are to 
be candidates for seats in single-seat constitu-
encies – supposed to receive budget subsidies 
for their regions and political support during 
the parliamentary election8 in exchange for 
canvassing on behalf of the head of state dur-
ing the presidential election. Poroshenko has 
weakened his opponents at the same time: em-
broiling the leader of Self-Reliance and popular 
Lviv mayor, Andriy Sadovyi, in the “waste dis-
posal site scandal”9, or bringing about the de-
portation of Mikheil Saakashvili. In March, the 
president attempted to discipline Hroisman, 
also without success, due to opposition from 
the People’s Front, by taking soundings in par-
7 Рада підтримала «ручне» призначення губернаторів, 
„Українська правда”, 9.11.2017, https://www.pravda.
com.ua/news/2017/11/9/7161224/ 
8 Р. Романюк, Бояри Петра ІІ. Вертикаль переобрання 
Порошенка, „Українська правда”, 20.12.2017, https://
www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/12/20/7166135/ 
9 T. Piechal, The ecological crisis in Lviv, „OSW Analyses”, 
15.06.2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2016-06-15/ecological-crisis-lviv 
Poroshenko began measures for re-elec-
tion by increasing his influence over the 
media, neutralising rivals, and entering into 
arrangements with oligarchs and people in 
local government.
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liament regarding his dismissal10. Meanwhile, 
the pro-European opposition, made up of the 
interfactional union of “Euro-Optimists”, minor 
political parties such as the Democratic Alliance 
and People’s Power, or for example a broad 
range of pro-reform NGOs, is on the one hand 
too weak and disintegrated, and on the other 
has support from the West which is strong 
enough to deter the presidential camp from tak-
ing more serious measures to weaken it. 
Poroshenko also sees greater control over the 
media as a way of strengthening his position. 
The presidential camp made an unsuccessful 
attempt to take over the most popular news 
channel, 112, created a new, pro-presidential 
medium of that type – Priamyj, and cut off fi-
nancing for public television, which stopped 
being biased in favour of the ruling powers fol-
lowing the Revolution of Dignity. 
Moves to win over the oligarchs
The ruling party has also reached an arrange-
ment with the oligarchs – owners of the most 
influential media and businesses, which employ 
in total hundreds of thousands of people (who 
are thus part of the electorate). In 2016 the 
Rotterdam+ Formula came into force, which is 
a new model for calculating the price of coal 
for electricity producers. The main beneficiary 
of such a scheme is the richest Ukraine citizen 
Rinat Akhmetov – owner of DTEK (a share of 
approximately 30 per cent in electricity pro-
duction) and popular media such as the tele-
vision station Ukraina and the daily newspaper 
Siegodnia. Some of the measures taken could 
be interpreted as gestures favouring the Dmytro 
Firtash Group, which controls the most popular 
television station, Inter. Firtash himself has ben-
efited from an increase in excise duty on the 
import of fertiliser from Russia, omissions when 
changing the management board of Zapo- 
10 Р. Романюк, Любов крізь зуби, або «Дружня зустріч» 
Порошенка і Гройсмана, „Українська правда”, 
18.04.2018, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/04/ 
18/7178076/ 
rozhye Titanium & Magnesium Plant11, and the 
blocking by the authorities of liberalisation 
of the internal gas market12. In turn, another 
representative of the group, Yuriy Boyko, cur-
rently the leader and likely candidate for the 
Opposition Bloc in the presidential election, 
was exonerated in a case involving fraudulent 
use of public funds for procurement of drilling 
platforms in 201113.
The ruling camp is also trying to avoid antag-
onising other oligarchs, such as the owner of 
the Starlight Media group, Victor Pinchuk, and 
seeking to ensure support of the influential 
agricultural lobby14. In fact, it is the oligarchs, 
as the principal owners of the regional elec-
tricity production and distribution companies 
(Oblenergo), that are intended to be the main 
beneficiaries of the new rules covering settle-
ment of payments between public authorities 
and these owners15. The only oligarch with 
whom the president has a conflict remains Ihor 
Kolomoyskyi, owner of the influential 1+1 Media 
group, although in recent months the presi-
dential camp seems to be attempting to come 
11 О. Мойсеєнко, Врятувати рядового олігарха: як 
держава допомагає Фірташу не втратити заводи, 
„Экономическая правда”, 3.04.2018, https://www.
epravda.com.ua/publications/2018/04/3/635557/ 
12 O. Kharchenko, Good to Be King: Ukraine’s Fugitive Oligarch 
Blocks Reforms and Benefits from International Handouts 
While Under House Arrest, Atlantic Council, 27.03.2018, 
ht tp: / / w w w.at lant i ccounc i l .o rg / b logs /uk ra ine 
alert /good-to-be-king-ukraine-s-fugitive-oligarch-
blocks-reforms-and-benefits-from-international-hand-
outs-while-under-house-arrest
13 For more information, see: O. Шалайський, 12 друзів 
«вишки Бойка», «Дзеркало тижня”, 17.02.2018, https://
dt.ua/internal/12-druziv-vishki-boyka-269593_.html 
14 О. Пирожок, Ігри в дотації: як аграрії взяли 4 мільярди, 
“Экономическая правда”, 1.02.2018, https://www.
epravda.com.ua/publications/2018/02/1/633634/ 
15 A. Åslund, Why Ukrainians Are So Upset about New Elec-
tricity Tariffs, Atlantic Council, 5.03.2018, http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-ukrainians-
are-so-upset-about-new-electricity-tariffs 
Poroshenko’s negative trend in the polls 
will cause past allies to desert, further re-
ducing his chances of re-election.
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to an arrangement with the oligarch and at 
least guarantee his neutrality. At the same time, 
most of the arrangements described above are 
dictated by the current situation, and could 
easily change if the negative tendency for Petro 
Poroshenko in the polls persists.
Campaign Message
As the campaign gains momentum, the presi-
dent will aim to reverse the negative trend in 
the polls by turning voters’ attention to the 
achievements of the last four years. The empha-
sis will be on foreign policy, domestic reforms, 
and security issues. Poroshenko will certainly 
stress the clear successes such as the liberali-
sation of the visa regime for Ukraine by the EU 
and the signing of an association agreement, 
goals which were fought for on the Maidan in 
2013 and 2014. Another subject will be that of 
ending dependence upon gas supplies from 
Russia and Ukraine’s victory in the dispute 
with Gazprom in the Arbitral Tribunal in Stock-
holm. As the supreme commander-in-chief of 
the Ukrainian army, the president will stress 
the reform and modernisation of the army, 
a strategic partnership with the US, illustrat-
ed by deliveries of Javelin anti-tank systems, 
and a consolidated approach of the Western 
world towards Russia, in the form of sanctions. 
Another relevant issue of the campaign is the 
war in the Donbas. Citing the formal end of the 
anti-terrorist operation and commencement of 
a military operation16, Poroshenko will prove 
that he is determined to bring an end to the 
conflict. The president will also argue that his 
signature on the Minsk agreements brought an 
end to the intensity of the conflict and opened 
the way for an exchange of prisoners. He will 
also float the idea of a UN peace-keeping mis-
sion as an effective instrument for reintegration 
of the Ukrainian Donbas.
16 Закон про реінтеграцію Донбасу опублікований 
в офіційній пресі, Radio Swoboda, 23.02.2018, https://
www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/29058470.html
Another important element of the campaign 
will be, for the first time on this scale, identi-
ty issues, which are becoming increasingly im-
portant in Ukraine. Poroshenko has mentioned 
these aspects more and more when speak-
ing publicly. The president stresses above all 
Ukraine’s divorce from Russia, the country’s 
‘regaining sovereignty’, and the forming of 
a new Ukrainian identity – European and demo-
cratic, separate from the Russian one – autocrat-
ic and imperial. In this context, actions such as 
a greater presence for the Ukrainian language 
in the media, an education bill promoting the 
native language, and a ban on the use of Russian 
social networks will be stressed in particular. 
The president has also initiated new projects 
to win over floating patriotic voters. The most 
important is supporting unification of Ukrain-
ian orthodox churches into a single structure, 
which could be done with the consent of Patri-
arch Bartholomew I of Constantinople. It can-
not be ruled out that the presidential camp will 
see this initiative as an opportunity not only to 
mobilise supporters of the de facto Ukrainian 
national church but also to engender a deep 
polarisation of society, which would lead to 
an increase in the popularity of politicians de-
fending Russian orthodoxy: Yuriy Boyko, Vadim 
Novinsky in the Opposition Bloc), being at the 
same time convenient opponents in the second 
round of a presidential election. 
Other initiatives in the “patriotic repertoire” 
entail the conclusion of work on the citizen-
ship act and a Ukrainian language act. These 
laws, the details of which are not known, could 
potentially draw a wave of criticism, not only 
from Russia but also from national minorities. 
The campaign will feature anti-Russian 
rhetoric and emphasis on the (re)gained 
sense of autonomy for Ukraine and its peo-
ple following the revolution.
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This could increase tension between Kyiv and 
its EU neighbours, above all with Hungary. 
The increasingly prevalent references to “sov-
ereignty” in Poroshenko’s rhetoric towards the 
West are an element of this narrative17. At the 
same time, it is doubtful whether these meas-
ures will significantly increase the president’s 
chances. For Ukrainians, questions such as can-
didates’ proposals for social solutions, methods 
of fighting corruption, or solutions for ending 
the war override language and culture issues 
when voting for politicians.
Pre-election challenges and dilemmas 
One year before the election, Petro Poroshen-
ko remains a major contender in the battle for 
the second round, yet securing re-election will 
be hard. Although opinion polls in Ukraine are 
often a tool for political rivalry and do not tru-
ly reflect social feeling, the dynamics indicate 
that support for the president is steadily de-
creasing, and 45% of voters say that they will 
never vote for the present president. This trend 
will define the modus operandi for Poroshenko 
himself and other political players. At the mo-
ment there are no signs of open revolt against 
the president among members of the ruling 
coalition. Clashes with Hroisman and Avakov 
may be treated as an element of negotiation in 
the process of creating a common front prior 
to the election, while fundamentally the media 
and oligarchs remain loyal. It is vital that Poro-
shenko retains a chance of ultimate success: se-
curing re-election and creating a large faction 
in the next parliament to form part of the rul-
ing coalition. If this opportunity does not arise 
at the turn of the year, the current partners – 
coalition partners, oligarchs and their television 
stations, members of parliament in single-seat 
17 Visible in particular in an interview with P. Poroshenko 
in Transcript of interview with Petro Poroshenko, 
“Financial Times”, 1.03.2018, https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/504403da-205b-11e8-9efc-0cd3483b8b80
constituencies18 and mayors of cities – will de-
sert. They will intensify their search for an alter-
native method of remaining in politics, placing 
hope in more promising candidates such as the 
current leaders in the polls: Yulia Tymoshenko 
or Anatoliy Hrytsenko – former defence minis-
ter (2005–2007) and supporter of strong-arm 
government, placed among the top three con-
tenders in recent opinion polls. At the same 
time, Poroshenko’s team does not seem to have 
any idea for how to compete with his main 
adversaries, primarily with Yulia Tymoshenko. 
It is possible that the fear of being compared 
with Viktor Yanukovych, who led to her impris-
onment in 2011, is restraining Poroshenko from 
making a head-on attack on the former prime 
minister. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko has so far 
been very effective in pointing out the current 
government’s increases of utility bills, and in ad-
dition to this she avoids flaunting her wealth and 
has not been mired in any corruption scandals. 
Another problem for Poroshenko is that due 
to anti-Russian social feeling and loss of the 
Crimea and part of the Donbas, it will be dif-
ficult to match his strategies to election cam-
paign techniques that have proven successful 
in the past: a pro-western candidate versus 
a proponent of closer relations with Russia. 
Most of the traditional supporters of the lat-
ter option, residing in uncontrolled areas, will 
not go to the polling stations. In addition, their 
18 There will presumably be no change to the current 
mixed electoral code providing for election of half of 
parliament from nationwide party lists and half from 
single-seat constituencies, although this was one of the 
main demands during the Revolution of Dignity.
Without a new, undeniable success the 
chances of re-election will be slight. From 
Poroshenko‘s point of view, the creation of 
a Ukrainian national church is intended to 
be just such a success.
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main political representative – the Opposition 
Bloc, which was built from the remains of the 
Party of Regions – has poor social support and 
is also weak due to internal fighting between 
the most important stakeholders in the group. 
The current president faces another challenge 
in maintaining the West’s support, which is 
a key source of legitimacy following the Revo-
lution of Dignity. Although Poroshenko is try-
ing to convince the US and EU that he is the 
best means of guaranteeing that the current 
pro-reform course is maintained, his credibility 
is waning and the language used by Western 
partners towards Kyiv is becoming ever harsher. 
Poroshenko has a dilemma: more disputes with 
the West, above all regarding the blocking of 
anti-corruption reform19, could lead to further 
losses in the opinion polls. Should subsequent 
loan instalments be witheld as a result, it could 
trigger a financial crisis in the run-up to the elec-
tion. On the other hand, continuing the reforms 
19 У. Безпалько, Антикорупційний суд: про що 
сперечаються Захід і українська влада, РБК-Україна, 
23.01.2018, https://daily.rbc.ua/ukr/show/antikorruptsion-
nyy-sud-sporyat-zapad-ukrainskaya-1516716048.html
by setting up the Anti-Corruption Court being 
demanded by lenders will upset the Ukraini-
an establishment, concerned for assets often 
gained through corruption, whose support is so 
important to Poroshenko prior to the election. 
The stakes in the forthcoming election are high 
– a win in the presidential election could cre-
ate a considerable advantage in the autumn 
parliamentary election and an opportunity to 
gain full power in the country. The presidential 
campaign for re-election will have a radically 
anti-Russian and dignity-related narrative, and 
in the final stages, when the main opponent 
emerges, the campaigning will be dirty, with 
allegations of furthering Russian interests, and 
a cynical use of those authorities responsible 
for public order and law enforcement against 
opponents. While these various themes play 
out, new revelations or surprises may spring up 
at the beginning of next year: a new force or 
new candidate might emerge, a favourite from 
other than the traditional political camps who is 
a serious contender for power, or Poroshenko’s 
withdrawal from the race, if the opinion polls 
show a clear danger of him losing credibility.
If the Ukrainian presidential election were to be held next week, how would you cast 
your vote? 
All, % Percentage of those 
intending to vote % 
Percentage of those 
intending to vote and 
have decided how 
they will vote % 
Yulia Tymoshenko 8.8 11.2 14.2 
Anatoliy Hrytsenko 6.6 8.6 10.9 
Yuriy Boyko 6.0 7.4 9.4 
Petro Poroshenko 5.5 7.3 9.3 
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk 6.0 7.3 9.2 
Oleh Lashko 5.5 6.6 8.4 
Vladimir Zelenskiy 5.8 6.5 8.3 
Vadim Rabinovich 3.8 5.0 6.4 
Andrij Sadovyi 1.9 2.6 3.3 
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko 1.2 1.6 2.0 
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All, % Percentage of those 
intending to vote % 
Percentage of those 
intending to vote and 
have decided how 
they will vote % 
Oleh Tiahnibok 1.1 1.4 1.8 
Arseniy Yatseniuk 1.0 1.2 1.5 
Other candidate 10.7 12.0 15.3 
Hard to say 19.3 21.5
I will not be voting 16.9
If the parliamentary election were to be held next week, how would you cast your vote?
All % Percentage of those 
intending to vote % 
Percentage of those 
intending to vote 
and have decided 
how they will vote, %
Batkivshchyna 9.2 12.7 15.6
Hromadians’ka pozycija 5.7 7.9 9.7
Opposition Bloc 6.1 7.8 9.6
Servant of the People 5.9 7.3 9.0
For Life 4.7 6.6 8.2
Radical Party 4.9 6.5 8.0
BPP Solidarity’ 4.5 6.1 7.6
Self-Reliance 3.1 4.2 5.2
Svoboda 2.3 3.1 3.8
Agrarian Party of Ukraine 1.9 2.4 2.9
Ukrainian Association 
of Patriots UKROP*
1.4 1.9 2.3
Other party 7.7 8.2 10.1 
Hard to say 17.4 18.9
I will not be voting 20.3
* The threshold is 3%, other parties featured in the poll have a support rating of less than 2% 
of those who intend to vote and have decided how they will vote
